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Abstract
In this paper, we examine international linkages in inflation and short-term interest
rates using a global sample of OECD and emerging economies. Using a Bayesian global
vector autoregression (GVAR) model, we show that for short-term interest rates both
movements in inflation and output play an important role. In advanced countries, how-
ever, international factors such as foreign interest rates appear as an important driver
of local interest rates. For inflation, we also find evidence for the importance of global
factors, such as price developments in other countries, oil prices and the exchange rate.
Again, this impact of global factors appears predominately in advanced countries.
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1 Introduction
To which extent have central banks (CBs) to consider global developments when formulating
their monetary policy and are they actually watching external factors? In the decisions of
CBs, inflation plays a prominent role. Many studies investigated how CBs react to shifts
in inflation and how, in turn, CBs monetary policy interest setting shapes inflation. VAR
modelling has become a common method to study this inflation - monetary policy nexus.
However, those studies generally neglect the likelihood that guiding indicators and policy
decisions of CBs may be subject to a number of global influences.
Monetary authorities underlined recently that their guiding indicator, inflation, has be-
come increasingly influenced by global factors (BIS, 2015; ECB, 2017). There are studies
presenting evidence in favor of correlation in price developments across trading partners
(Lombardi and Galesi, 2009; Auer et al., 2017) or a common component across countries
(Ciccarelli and Mojon, 2005; Mumtaz and Surico, 2012).
Furthermore, the necessity for central banks to base their policy decisions not only on
domestic developments but also on international ones and the potential spillovers from other
countries’ monetary policy, notably that of the USA or the euro area, has been stressed by
Taylor (2014).1Empirically, Chatterjee (2016) identifies a common factor in monetary policies
of the major advanced economies.
In view of this evidence of likely global forces on the single elements of the inflation
- monetary policy nexus, we think it is highly important to consider such global influences
when studying the relationships in this nexus in a VAR model. While existing work in the field
(e.g., Svensson, 1999; Bernanke et al., 2005; Primiceri, 2005) mostly assumed that countries
were isolated economies, we explicitly wish to account for the likelihood of international
linkages and therefore use a global vector autoregressive (GVAR) model. In this set up we
are able to consider (i) external linkages of inflation which may, for example, arise from price
spillovers from trading partners, and (ii) global linkages of monetary policy rates which may
arise, for example, when central bankers watch the development of the business cycle and of
interest rates in other countries since those might matter for domestic exchange rates due
to financial linkages. Since the GVAR uses a Bayesian algorithm, we also can account for
variable uncertainty and select models with high probability.
Our empirical study covers all major trading economies, 24 OECD economies plus the
major emerging market economies,2 using quarterly data for the period from 1995 to 2016.
More specifically we collect data for euro area (EA) countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany
Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia), other
advanced economies (Australia, Canada, the USA, the UK, Switzerland, Japan, Norway and
Sweden), Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe (CESEE, Czech Republic, Hungary and
1Taylor (2007) proposes that central banks should explicitly watch the events in other economies and
observe monetary decisions of other central banks and proposes that monetary authorities should ideally act
in a cooperative manner
2The few other studies with an open economy set up either focus on a smaller sample of countries, thus
omitting potentially important trade and financial flows (Dees et al., 2007; Chin et al., 2018; Kamber and
Wong, 2018) or a different time period when monetary policy was less focused (Pesaran et al., 2004; Galesi
and Sgherri, 2009)
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Poland), and major emerging markets (EMEs, Brazil, Mexico, China, India, Russia and
Turkey). In this set-up:
i we study how the system reacts to inflation shocks by looking at impulse responses,
notably of short-term interest rates and output. Unlike in most studies, we impose no
timing assumption in order to identify the results from the GVAR estimation. Instead
we calculate generalized impulse response functions which does not require heavy as-
sumption often not supported by the reality. This allows us to remain within a rich
model setup.
ii we examine the determinants of inflation on the one hand, and short-term money market
interest rates - our proxy for monetary policy - on the other hand, by looking at forecast
error variance decompositions (FEVD). This analysis permits us
- to show the contribution of domestic vs global factors in explaining inflation and interest
rates.
- Furthermore the rich model setup allows us to disentangle inflation and interest rate
determinants into several categories. Thus we examine the impact of domestic demand,
monetary policy, currency fluctuations and external price variations on inflation. And
for monetary policy, the impact of inflation, output and currency development as well
as of foreign interest rates and foreign output development is tested.
- We can compare what drives inflation and monetary policy in the short run and in the
long run.
- We are able to look at differences in inflation and monetary policy determinants between
countries and country groups (advanced countries, EMEs, CESEE).
We know of no other study that addresses these issues in such a comprehensive scope.3
Our analysis provides a number of interesting results: First, our analysis suggests that
changes in domestic inflation lead to an increase in short-term interest rates and consequently
to a decrease in output growth. The reaction of monetary policy in advanced countries is
less pronounced compared to CESEE and EMEs. As practically all economies in our sample
have adopted inflation targeting (IT) we interpret this as evidence that particularly in EMEs
and CESEE monetary authorities are highly committed to the set target.
Second, from the FEVD, we see that foreign factors account for 50 per cent of forecast
error variance associated with inflation in the short-run and for 80 per cent in the long-run.
The global impact on inflation is much smaller in CESEE and EMEs. Foreign prices explain
55 per cent of inflation in advanced countries. Currency and oil price developments affect
inflation of all countries. The second most important factor for inflation in the long-run is
monetary policy, in several EMEs this is even the most important factor.
3Only Lombardi and Galesi (2009) study inflation in a similar setting using a GVAR model, but an outdated
data set and smaller country coverage. Recently, Feldkircher and Siklos (2018) also uses a similar econometric
approach but focuses on the link between inflation and inflation expectations for a large set of countries.
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Third, the FEVDs reveal that in advanced countries, global factors account for over 50
per cent of forecast error variances associated to short-term interest rates in the long-run,
whereas in the short-run domestic factors dominate. In contrast, the influence of domestic
factors on interest rates dominates in EMEs irrelevant whether short or long-run. In all
regarded economies, interest rates follow price development, output development and cur-
rency fluctuations (except for the USA and euro area). This suggests that monetary policy
is concerned about these factors. Finally, our results show that in all countries, particularly
in advanced ones, interest rates follow foreign output and interest rates, which proposes that
monetary policy considers such global trends.
Our study has important policy implications. We see that in a globalized world, CBs
have a challenging job. One of their main policy objective, price stability, is increasingly
influenced by foreign prices and not primarily by their interest policy. Furthermore, the
example of the advanced countries shows that CBs will have to consider more and more
developments in foreign output, prices and interest rates the more open countries become.
Our study provides evidence that CBs not only discuss such issues but actually seem to
consider them in their policy decisions.
The paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents the econometric model.
Section 3 outlines our hypotheses reviews closely related literature. Section 4 discuss the
results and section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We employ a Bayesian GVAR model in order to capture cross-country linkages in our sample.
This framework is perfectly suited for our research idea since it allows us to be flexible in
defining individual country models, however, it also permits us to uncover potential depen-
dencies across countries.
The GVAR model builds on a sequence of N +1 country-specific VAR models that repre-
sent the relationship between domestic and international macroeconomic factors jointly.4 The
model for a typical country i includes the following variables based on quarterly frequency:
real yoy GDP growth (∆y), yoy inflation based on the CPI index (pi), short-term nominal
interest rates (3-months money market rates, i) as a proxy for monetary policy, the term
spread (difference between 10-year government bond yields and short-term interest rates,
sp), equity prices (eq), the real exchange rate vis-á-vis the US dollar (er) and yoy change in
the prices of the crude oil Brent (poil)5
4Our sample covers all major economies. These heavily trade with each other and cover major world trade
and financial linkages. The export shares with the rest of the sample reach 60 to above 90 per cent. Practically
all countries practice inflation targeting.
5Our system contains equity prices and term spreads to represent the financial side of the economy. Recent
literature stresses the importance of the global financial cycle (Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2018) that ampli-
fies cross-country spillovers. We use financial variables to account for their potential role as shock propagators.
Additionally, term spreads serve as a measure of unconventional monetary policy following Baumeister and
Benati (2013) and Chen et al. (2016), among others. The time line of our analysis intercepts with the so-called
binding zero lower bound period when policy rates were at/near zero and quantitative easing was the only
way for central banks to provide some stimulus. As monetary policy aims to lower long-term yields, term
spread can serve as a measure of monetary policy during times of unconventional instruments. New approaches
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For countries where interest rates stayed at the zero lower bound such as the euro area,
Japan, the UK and the USA, we use shadow interest rates of Krippner (2013). These mirror
actual interest rates during normal periods and can become negative when the zero lower
bound is binding but the central bank provides additional stimulus through unconventional
monetary policy measures.
We collect all variables for country i in a ki × 1 vector xit
xit = (∆yit, piit, iit, spit, eqit, erit)′. (1)
Depending on data availability and country-specifics, this specification can vary for each
country.
We then assume that the dynamics of the ki endogenous variables in country i are de-
scribed by the following VARX(p = 2, q = 2) model,
xit =
p=2∑
j=1
Aijxit−j +
q=2∑
s=0
Bisx
∗
it−s + εit, (2)
with Aij (j = 1, . . . , p) being ki × ki-dimensional coefficient matrices. Bis, (s = 0, . . . , q)
are coefficient matrices of dimension ki × k∗i associated with the weakly-exogenous variables
and εit is a normally distributed vector error term with a time-varying variance-covariance
matrix Σit.
The weakly exogenous or international variables x∗it are the main mechanism through
which spillovers and feedback is passed on between countries. These are simply computed as
a weighted average of the other countries’ endogenous variables:
x∗it =
N∑
j=0
wijxjt, for i ∈ {0, . . . , N}, (3)
Here wij denotes a set of bilateral weights that reflect economic interaction between countries
i and j, normalized to sum up to unity.6 As is common in the literature using GVARs, wij
are based on bilateral trade flows. More precisely, we use annual data from the World Input
Output Database (WIOD), averaged over the period from 2000 to 2014.7 Recently, other
weights based on, e.g., financial flows have been proposed in the literature (see, e.g., Eickmeier
and Ng, 2015). However, Feldkircher and Huber (2016) present a sensitivity analysis with
respect to the choice of weights in Bayesian GVAR specifications and show that trade weights
yield a reasonable model fit.
to measure monetary policy generally focus on the yield curve as a vehicle through which monetary policy
materializes (Inoue and Rossi, 2018). Moreover, there is evidence on interconnectedness of long-term interest
rates across advanced economies (Chin et al., 2018).
6For simplicity we assume here that all countries feature the same number of endogenous variables in xjt.
In the empirical application the dimension of x∗it depends on the country.
7In this way, the weight of a foreign countryj ’s variable corresponds to its share in countryi’s imports. The
data is retrieved from http://www.wiod.org/home and only available up until 2014. For a detailed description
see Timmer et al. (2015).
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A convenient feature of the GVAR framework is that the variable coverage can vary across
countries. We include the respective foreign counterparts for all domestic variables xit – with
two exceptions. First, and to control for exchange rate movements in a broader sense, we
include trade-weighted exchange rates in the USA where no domestic exchange rate (vis-à-vis
the US dollar) exists.
The second exception relates to how we model monetary policy in the euro area. Following
Georgiadis (2015) and Feldkircher et al. (2019) we introduce an "ECB" country model where
monetary policy is determined by a simple Taylor rule. More specifically, the 3-month Euribor
is regressed on purchasing power parity (PPP)-weighted averages of output and consumer
price inflation of euro area countries. Euro area short-term interest rates enter then into all
(also non-euro area) country models as a weakly exogenous variable. Last and in line with
the bulk of the GVAR literature, we include oil price inflation (poil, Brent, in US dollar) as
a global control variable that is assumed to be determined within the US country model (see
e.g., Pesaran et al., 2004).
In what follows we relax the assumption of a homoskedastic error term to account for the
relatively volatile time period under study: For many countries, the sample span includes
a boom period (up until 2006) and a severe bust period (2008/09) followed by a diverse
recovery. Also, the recent literature demonstrates that including stochastic volatility leads
to improved forecasts (Dovern et al., 2016; Huber, 2016) and thus to more useful models.
Following Cogley and Sargent (2005) we can decompose Σit as follows
Σit = UiHitU ′i , (4)
where Ui is a ki×ki-dimensional lower triangular matrix with unit diagonal and off-diagonal
elements denoted by uij,n (j = 2, . . . , ki;n = 1, . . . , j − 1) and Hit is a diagonal matrix
with Hit = diag(ehi1,t , . . . , ehiki,t). We assume that the log-volatilities hij,t follow an AR(1)
process,
hij,t = µij + ρij(hij,t−1 − µij) + κij,t. (5)
Hereby we let µij denote the (unconditional) mean of the log-volatility, ρij is the persistence
parameter and κij,t denotes a white noise error with variance ς2ij .
To reduce estimation uncertainty we employ a Bayesian shrinkage prior to estimate co-
efficients and variance covariance parameters of the country models. More specifically, we
follow Feldkircher and Huber (2016) and Feldkircher et al. (2019) and estimate the country
VARs using the stochastic search variable selection (SSVS) prior of George and McCulloch
(1993) adapted for the VAR case in George et al. (2008). The prior choice is guided by the
nature of our wide sample of countries. It permits to account for parameter uncertainty at
country level.
The SSVS prior falls into the category of spike and slab priors. One of the main prob-
lems in vector autoregressions is that of overparametrization. The GVAR framework, where
the two-step procedure of first estimating the single country models and then stacking the
6
estimated coefficients together, reduces the curse of dimensionality significantly. That said,
even here a lot of parameters per country model have to be estimated. For a typical country
this amounts to 62 + 63 parameters plus a constant term and the stochastic volatility part.
Let us rewrite equation 2 stacking all autoregressive parameters into one matrix Ci:
xit = CiZit + it. (6)
where Zit = (x′it−1, x′it−2, x∗
′
it−1, x∗
′
it−2)′. The SVVS prior placed on the vector of coefficients
ci =vec(Ci), now draws from a mixture of two normal distributions
cij |δij ∼ N (0, τ2ij,0)δij+ ∼ N (0, τ2ij,1)(1− δij). (7)
Important is that τ2ij,0  τ2ij,1 which renders the first distribution effectively uninformative
and the second one tightly centered around the prior mean, zero in our case. Using only
the first distribution would thus lead to estimates that are close to a VAR estimated with
maximum likelihood. These estimates, however, would be subject to over-parametrization
issues.
To circumvent this behavior, a latent indicator δij is introduced that pushes coefficients
associated with irrelevant variables to zero. To decide which of the two priors becomes
effective, we thus have to simulate δij from its conditional posterior by drawing from a
Bernoulli distribution with probability p(δij = 1) =
N (cij |0,τ2ij,0)
N (cij |0,τ2ij,0)+N (cij |0,τ2ij,1)
within each sweep
of the MCMC algorithm. Notice that if a given draw of cij is small, it is thus more likely that
δij = 0 and more shrinkage is attached by specifying the prior variance to be close to zero.
This, in the next step of the MCMC algorithm, pushes the corresponding full conditional
posterior of cij to zero. The full prior setup as well as information in the Markov chain
Monte Carlo algorithm is given in appendix A.
Finally, the sequence of N + 1 country models can be combined to yield a global VAR
model,
Gxt =
p∗∑
n=1
Fnxt−n + ηt. (8)
Hereby, we let xt = (x′0t, . . . ,x′Nt)′ denote a k =
∑N
j=0 kj-dimensional vector that collects all
endogenous variables in the system, G is a k×k matrix of contemporaneous coefficients that
are a function of the Bi0 matrices and the weights in wij and p∗ = max(p, q) = 2. Moreover,
Fn are k × k matrices of autoregressive coefficients that are driven by the weights and the
estimates of Aij for all countries and ηt is a k-dimensional vector white noise process with a
block-diagonal matrix Σt = bdiag(Σ0t, . . . ,ΣNt).
Multiplying with G−1 from the left yields the reduced-form GVAR model that closely
resembles a standard VAR model with parametric restrictions imposed through the weights
7
wij ,
xt =
p∗∑
n=1
ψnxt−n + vt. (9)
The reduced-form VAR coefficients are given by ψn = G−1Fn and vt is a k-dimensional
vector of white noise errors with variance given by Ωt = G−1Σt(G−1)′.
We impose no timing identification restrictions as done by most studies. Instead we
calculate generalized impulse response functions (GIRFs) proposed in (Pesaran and Shin,
1998). This way we avoid the necessity to put identifying assumptions often not supported
by theoretical predictions or empirical evidence. On the basis of our impulse responses we
later construct generalized forecast error variance decompositions (GFEVDs) akin to Lanne
and Nyberg (2016) in order to assess what drives the variation in our system.
In particular, we follow Pesaran and Shin (1998) and calculate GIRFs as:
GIRFj(hor) = E[xt+hor|jt = √σjjTt−1]− E[xt+hor|Tt−1] (10)
where hor is the horizon of the impulse response, j is the variable from the original vector
xit and Tt−1 is the information set before period t. Given this we calculate the GFEVD as:
θij(hor) =
∑hor
l=0GIRFj(hor)2∑k
j=1
∑hor
l=0GIRFj(hor)2
(11)
In our analysis j always corresponds to inflation. We calibrate it as a 1 percentage point
increase in inflation.
3 Main hypotheses and related literature
Since our focus of interest is the conduct of monetary policy of highly interconnected economies
practicing inflation targeting and to study the impact of global forces, let us now discuss the
intuition and hypotheses of (i) the inflation equation and (ii) short term interest rate equation
in our GVAR in more detail.
As inflation can be assumed to be a key signal for monetary policy in our set of countries,
we are interested in the driving forces of inflation, measured by yoy growth of quarterly CPI,
be it domestic or global. In our VAR, inflation is explained by the domestic factors such as
output growth and monetary policy, and global factors, which are the inflation of trading
partner countries, the exchange rate, the oil price, and trading partners output development
and monetary policy rates.
First, the Phillips curve and Okun’s law imply a positive relation between inflation and
output growth. Inflation can be expected to increase over the business cycle due to wage
pressures and scarcities when capacities get fully employed. In our inflation equation, this
demand side aspect of inflation is considered by two variables measuring output growth: real
output growth and development of equity prices (∆y, eq).
8
Several studies tested this argument. Boschi and Girardi (2007) find in a structural VAR
that in the euro area, inflation is partly driven by the output gap, partly by cost factors.
Coe and McDermott (1997) propose that the output gap drives inflation in Asian countries.
Mohanty and John (2015) using a time varying SVAR model find that the output gap is a
major determinant of inflation in India in boom periods. Domaç and Yücel (2005) find that
demand drives inflation in emerging markets, besides, food prices and fiscal policies. The
pro-cyclicality of inflation seems to be sensitive to the time period considered (Primiceri,
2005; Cogley et al., 2010).
Second, according to the quantity theory of money, an increase of the nominal money
supply above output growth results in a price increase. In our equation, this is considered by
the variables interest rate (i) and term spread (sp), representing money growth. An increase
of those is expected to lead to a decrease of inflation.
Third, when global linkages are considered, inflation should also be influenced by the price
development in other countries from which intermediaries and consumer goods are imported,
by developments of the exchange rate and of commodity prices, notably the oil price (cost
push factors).8 In addition, global output developments may affect inflation through demand
effects on the domestic economy and the effect on global energy and commodity prices.9
Awareness that inflation today depends less on domestic factors but increasingly on global
factors due to the inter-connectedness of economies, has risen. The BIS 2014 Annual Report
stresses that recent inflation behaviour can be explained by accounting for global devel-
opments in input and factor markets, but also product markets since firms have to watch
more closely the pricing of their abroad competitors when openness increases. Strong ex-
port economies are likely to experience a decline of mark-ups and lower inflation. Similar
arguments are provided in Pain et al. (2006) who investigate the effect of globalization on
OECD countries’ inflation and find evidence that cheaper imports from emerging markets
have lowered inflation. Furthermore, according to BIS (2015), Ciccarelli and Mojon (2005)
and (Mumtaz and Surico, 2012), individual inflation rates increasingly contain a common
component that follows a global business cycle. Already Ciccarelli and Mojon (2005) found
in a principal component analysis that 70 per cent of inflation in OECD countries follows a
common component.10
A specific global element of inflation arises from the development of commodity and energy
prices. The literature on the influence of oil prices on inflation rates is manifold. Recent work
by Choi et al. (2017) confirms a positive relation between oil price increase and inflation in
8Traditionally, the inflation literature distinguishes demand pull and cost push factors for inflation. The
cost push view of inflation considers that inflation is determined by wage costs and import prices. In the
empirical literature, Boschi and Girardi (2007), for example, propose that, besides the output gap, inflation
is driven by the cost push factors wages and import prices. Alexova (2012), using a structural co-integrated
VAR to analyze inflation drivers in CESEE in the period 1996-2011, proposes that mainly labour costs would
drive inflation in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland, followed by import prices in second place. Due to
data constraints we do not include wage costs in our model.
9Other factors determining inflation, often studied in the literature with developing countries, are public
sector deficits which may lead to monetarization and thus raise inflation (Alexova, 2012; Mohanty and John,
2015; Saatcioglu and Korap, 2006).
10A related strand of literature investigates the effect of globalization, given by trade and financial openness,
on the inflation level, for example Badinger (2009) and Gnan and Valderrama (2006).
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advanced and developing countries but points out that the effect has become smaller over
time and is asymmetric for increases versus decreases of oil price.
While existing studies have accounted for global factors of inflation by considering import
or oil prices and exchange rates as global determinants of national inflation, this study con-
siders more comprehensive and specific global factors likely to influence inflation. It includes:
• the specific inflation developments of all main trading partners to capture price devel-
opments of inputs and of competing final products (pi∗);
• the exchange rate of an economy as well as exchange rates of trading partners to account
for development of import prices (er, er∗);
• the oil price (poil) to account for price developments arising from the major commodity
price;
• foreign output (∆y∗) and equity developments (eq∗) considered to represent the devel-
opment in foreign demand and business cycle;
• foreign interest rates (i∗) and term spreads (sp∗) since they can be expected to affect
relative exchange rate movements that would influence inflation.
The second variable of interest in our VAR concerns monetary policy. Already said,
as a proxy, 3-months money market rates (like the euribor) are considered. We assume
that interest rates are determined by an extended Taylor rule, where inflation (pi) and output
(∆y, eq) as well as exchange rate developments (er) are considered by monetary authorities.11
In addition to domestic factors, the equations contain the global factors: interest rates, term
spreads and output growth of trading partners (i∗, sp∗,∆y∗, eq∗).
That inflation rates guides monetary policy and thus our observed interest rates, can be
expected as we consider a group of explicit or implicit inflation targeters.12 13
We would also expect that this equation informs us which weight monetary policy puts.
on output development and the currency value
Since in an open economy, the interest rate affects the exchange rate via the interest
parity condition, Svensson (1999) proposes that CBs use a Taylor rule augmented by the
exchange rate. A positive interest rate differential, e.g., of US dollar bonds relative to euro
bonds would attract euro area investors and provoke financial outflows from the euro area.
As a consequence, the US dollar should appreciate and the euro depreciate. Evidence can be
found that the euro/dollar exchange rate follows its short-term interest differential. For the
11Note that in the strict Taylor rule CBs would set their interest rates according to deviation of inflation
from a target and the output gap.
12In this sample, all advanced countries have officially or unofficially introduced IT in the 1990. In the
euro area, which is bound to price stability, the Maastricht convergence criteria requested low inflation for
joining EMU. The starting dates of IT of the other advanced countries are: Canada 1991, UK 1992, Australia
1994, Sweden 1995, Switzerland 2000, Norway 2001. The USA and Japan follow a price stability objective as
the euro area. CESEE countries in our sample introduced IT between 1998-2001. Among our EMEs, Brazil
introduced IT in 1999 and Mexico in 2001, Russia 2007. In China and India the focus on inflation started in
2002 and 2013 respectively, India adopting IT officially only in 2016, but China not yet so. (Combes et al.,
2017; Jahan, 2017; Benes et al., 2017)
13Note that the Fisher effect would also postulate a co-movement between inflation and interest rates.
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EMEs, according to Caporale et al. (2018), such an exchange rate augmented Taylor rule is
requested to describe their interest rate setting. As our sample includes countries with fairly
stable exchange rates and others with more volatile rates, we expect that the coefficient of
the exchange rate in the monetary policy equation will be heterogeneous across countries.
In addition to domestic factors, it appears quite plausible that CBs take into account
global developments as well (Del Negro et al., 2018). They might be guided by interest rate
and output developments in other countries. For example, the ECB might consider the US
interest rate policy and US growth. The interest policy because the interest differential to the
USA will influence the Euro exchange rate and consequently EA exports and financial flows.
The output development, first, since the output development is a guideline for the ECB which
interest movement to expect in the USA, and second, because the EA output development
signalled to ECB policy makers is influenced by the growth prospects in the US export mar-
ket. Several arguments in this sense can be found in the literature. Hofmann and Bogdanova
(2012) argue that particularly EMEs consider the movement of monetary policy rates abroad
in order to avoid exchange rate movements and unwelcome capital flows. Bernanke et al.
(2005), pointing to the Mundell Fleming trilemma, recall that the independence of EMEs
monetary policy is limited if they wish to maintain a stable exchange rate. Furthermore,
Defever et al. (2016), stressing the important interconnectedness of global economies through
trade and financial markets, advocates that monetary policy has to consider the interest set-
ting abroad because of exchange rate and export effects. They claim that moderate foreign
growth and low foreign interest rates had prevented from early return to monetary normal-
ization. On the other side, the US asset purchase program would not only have resulted
in currency appreciations and lesser competitiveness abroad but other countries would have
benefited from awaking US demand. Starting from these arguments well based in theory, we
propose in this study that CBs will closely watch the interest rate policy of other countries
in formulating their monetary policy.
4 Results
Our analysis covers 24 OECD economies plus major emerging market economies for the
period 1995-2016. The estimates are based on quarterly data and data are taken from the
IMF database and national sources.
First, we consider the impulse response of output and interest rates following domestic,
inflationary shocks. We calibrate the shock to a 1 percentage point increase in domestic
inflation and provide generalized impulse response functions in Figures 1 and 2. The figures
show the posterior median along with 50% and 68% credible intervals.14
In general, interest rates increase as a consequence of a sudden rise in inflation. The
increase in interest rates is modest in most advanced countries. A clear exception is the USA
where interest rates react significantly to an inflationary shock. In a few countries interest
rates decline and only rise with a considerable lag (Japan, UK). Since this reaction is robust
14Our credible intervals correspond to 25-75 per cent and 16-84 per cent credible sets, dark grey and light
grey shaded areas respectively.
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to different model specification (with or without oil prices) this reaction can be regarded as
evidence that the Bank of England and Bank of Japan react comparably less to inflation than
central banks in other advanced economies.15 In contrast, for certain EMEs (Brazil, Mexico)
and CESEE (Hungary, Poland) the increase in interest rates is substantial.16 We consider
the different extent of reaction of interest rates to changes in inflation as evidence that some
CBs are more concerned about inflation than others.
The impulse responses show that as a consequence output generally decreases. The decline
can be important in some advanced economies (Japan), including the euro area (Germany,
Italy, Finland, Greece), and in Poland where the interest rate increase is strong. There are
important exceptions from the negative reaction of output. In the USA, output increases
despite the sharp increase in interest rates. In the euro area, despite ECB’s interest increase,
we find a most striking increase in output in Spain. Also in Ireland and Slovenia we see
a positive response of output. It increases first slightly, before dropping. The puzzling
decline of interest rates is followed by an increase in output in the UK. In most EMEs,
except for Brazil, output increases (Mexico, India) or first increases before dropping (Russia,
Turkey). Interestingly, the same countries show an increase of output across different model
specification and estimation methods.17.
Why should output increase despite raising interest rates? An obvious reason is that
strong demand effects are linked with inflation in those countries so that output continues
to increase or only drops with a delay after the interest rate increases. In the euro area,
for the interest rate increase we found for the ECB, one has to remember that it is guided
by developments in its major economies so that it would not sufficiently react to individual
booms like in Spain or Ireland. In oil producing countries, the output increase associated
with a rise in inflation may have another cause. Since inflation is also driven by oil prices,
and rising oil prices would motivate oil production to increase, an additional output effect
should arise.18 Yet another argument for rising output has been proposed in the literature.
Kozicki and Tinsley (2005) argue that if an inflation shock is perceived as permanent, CBs
would increase their standard interest rate level and output would still grow.
Determinants of inflation based on a generalized forecast variance
decomposition
15Our period of study coincides with the zero interest rates period of Japan when the Bank of Japan was
primarily focused on increasing inflation. It was operating with unconventional monetary policy tools. This
can serve as an explanation for the inaction of the Bank of Japan on impact raise of inflation.
16The case of China is outstanding as we observe no reaction of its interest rates to the raise in inflation.
China is the only country in our sample that does not follow an official inflation target. In fact, an official
objective of the People’s Republic Bank of China is the stability of its currency rate in order to facilitate
economic growth. This suggests that China’s central bank has other monetary policy objectives. Nevertheless,
we find it important to include China into the analysis as it represents an important trading partner for many
countries of our sample.
17We have carried out additional estimations which are available from the authors upon request. These
cover for example impulse responses based on a Cholesky decomposition, as well as GVAR models with and
without oil price and using the euro as an exchange rate numeraire.
18Indeed the output increase is higher in the USA in the model specification including oil prices.
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We shall now turn to the determinants of inflation from a generalized forecast error
variance decomposition (GFEVD). Technically, the forecast error variance decomposition is
based on the posterior mean calculated as a running mean over all posterior draws of the
regression coefficients of the GVAR. This is in contrast to standard procedures that calculate
variance decompositions only for a point estimate of the GVAR coefficient (in a Bayesian
setting the posterior median or in a classical setting the OLS estimate). Here, we do not
ignore parameter uncertainty which improves upon existing studies. Moreover, as the shares
of GFEVDs do not sum up to unity we employ the recently proposed normalization of Lanne
and Nyberg (2016).
We will now discuss the results from two perspectives. First, we will group explanatories
of inflation into domestic and global components. This will permit us to identify to which
extent shocks to inflation are driven by domestic as opposed to foreign shocks. Second, we
will discuss inflation from a functional perspective, namely to which extent forecast error
variances are accounted for by previous inflation, foreign prices, exchange rates, demand
factors and monetary policies.
In the short term, in most countries forecast error variance of inflation can be accounted
for by domestic factors (see figure 3). The impact of domestic factors is distinctly lower in the
euro area where it accounts for even less than 50 per cent in small and highly trading countries
(Austria and Belgium, as well as Germany, France and Spain). Also in Switzerland the role of
domestic factors for inflation has dropped to about 30 per cent. The role of domestic factors
is much higher in the short run in advanced countries with big internal markets like the USA
and Japan. Domestic factors are dominating shares of forecast error variance in CESEE and
even more so in EMEs, where in the short run external factors are hardly important.
The diminishing role of global factors for inflation from advanced to CESEE economies
and EMEs appears also in the long term. In most advanced countries, global factors account
for some 80 per cent of forecast error variance of inflation in the long term. Exceptions
are the USA, Japan, Norway, Greece and Slovakia. In CESEE, shares of explained forecast
error variance associated with global factors amount to 50 to 80 per cent in the long term.
In EMEs, the impact of global factors is below 50 per cent in the long run, in Russia and
Mexico even below 20 per cent.
Our results are in line with ECB Economic Bulletin 2017 which proposes that on average
in the euro area 50 per cent of inflation results from global factors.
The second way of discussing inflation determinants is from a functional perspective. We
group inflation determinants into:
- Lagged domestic inflation to account for inflation persistence (pit−1)
- Foreign price developments and currency variations as inflation drivers
– Inflation of trading partners (pi∗)
– Oil price development (poil)
– Fluctuation of domestic currency or currency fluctuations of trade partners (er, er∗)
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- Demand proxied by output growth and equity price development:
– Domestic demand (∆y, eq)
– External demand (∆y∗, eq∗)
- Monetary policy proxied by short-term money market rates and term spreads (to ac-
count for unconventional monetary policy:
– Domestic interest rate and term spread (i, sp)
– Foreign interest rate and term spread (i∗, sp∗) as indicator for relative money
growth.
The following patterns can be observed from the FEVD (see tables 1, 2, 3).
Domestic lagged inflation always accounts for most of forecast error variance in the short
run. This indicates that inflation patterns generally show a high degree of persistence in the
short run. High inflation in the beginning of the year will be followed by high inflation during
the rest of the year. This persistence is particularly high in EMEs where 88-96 per cent of
present inflation is explained by past inflation, but similarly high values above 86 are also
found in the USA, Japan, Norway, Greece and Slovakia. Also in CESEE, lagged inflation
explains between 61-79 per cent of present inflation. In contrast, lagged inflation is a much
less important explanatory of present inflation in the other advanced countries and the euro
area (explaining only around 13 per cent in Switzerland, 22-23 per cent in Spain, Austria and
France). The high persistence of inflation in certain advanced countries and in EMEs can be
explained by less openness and thus higher importance of national price setting and higher
regulated price setting, like price controls. The same divide between advanced and emerging
economies in inflation persistence is found in de Oliveira and Petrassi (2010). For India, also
Mohanty and John (2015) find an equally high value of lagged inflation as in our results. For
the advanced countries, an explanation proposed in the literature is that truly credible IT
reduces inflation persistence (Kocenda and Varga, 2017).
In the long run (after 12 quarters), lagged inflation accounts for less than 10 per cent of
forecast error variance in most advanced countries. Exceptions are the USA, Norway, Greece
and Slovakia. The particular high persistence of inflation in these countries reflects high
stability and low reversability of inflation. In CESEE and EMEs the impact of past inflation
is higher, explaining in the long term between about 20 to almost 50 per cent of present
inflation. As in the short term, the influence of past inflation is highest in Russia with 70 per
cent, possibly reflecting high price regulation.
Shocks to foreign prices explain considerably forecast error variance of inflation in ad-
vanced countries (table 3). In the short term, in the euro area, foreign price developments
account for up to 55 per cent of forecast error variance of inflation. Interestingly, the effect
from foreign prices becomes weaker in the long term. Further, the effect is weaker in advanced
countries with a large internal market (USA, Japan) or with low export openness (Greece).
In CESEE and EMEs the impact of foreign price developments remains significantly lower,
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mostly below 5 per cent in the short term but increases, opposite to the sequence of influence
of foreign prices on inflation in the advanced countries.
If we look more closely into these results (not shown in table 3 for sake of space), we
observe that shocks to Russian inflation account for the largest share of foreign variables in
the euro area, followed by shocks to US inflation. This reflects important linkages of euro
area countries, Russia being a major energy supplier, the USA being Europe’s most important
export market. We find that in the USA and Canada, shocks to Mexico’s inflation accounts
for significant shares of forecast error variance of national inflation.
These results highlight on the one hand the importance of intermediary product supplies
for advanced countries since their price development importantly affects domestic inflation.
On the other hand, it also reflects that advanced economies are more active exporters and
exposed to price competition. Such effects have been addressed in the literature. For example,
Pain et al. (2006) propose that cheaper intermediary imports lowered OECD prices. Our
results are novel compared to other studies stressing import price effects. While those are
mostly restricted to testing the effect of exchange rates or consider general import prices of a
country, our study explicitly considers the impact of inflation in trading partners’ economies.
Shocks to inflation in the Brent oil price account for about 2-3 per cent of forecast error
variance of inflation in most economies. This share increases in the long term by about one
percentage point.19 In self-extracting economies (Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Norway), shocks to
inflation in the Brent oil price do not account for significant shares of forecast error variance
of domestic inflation in the short term.20 Only in the long term an impact appears.
Since variations in the exchange rate vis-á-vis the US dollar influence the price of imported
goods, we expect that this factor also matters for inflation. We find such evidence in all
our countries. In the advanced countries, including euro area core economies, this effect
doubles after three years and accounts for about 10-20 per cent of forecast error variances. In
some countries such as Austria, Switzerland and Finland, the exchange rate effect is already
important in the short term, with 11, 15 and 12 per cent respectively, which increases further
in the long term. Shocks to exchange rates are thus most important in the euro area core
countries, in particular in Austria, Finland and the Netherlands.
Shocks to the exchange rate account for less forecast error variance of inflation in euro
area periphery countries in the short run. In the long run, though shares are similar compared
to those in euro area core countries. The same phenomenon is found in CESEE and EMEs.
Particularly in China, the long-term effect of exchange rate changes on inflation is high and
reaches 16 per cent. The different time pattern in these groups of countries in contrast to
the advanced economies may be caused by exchange rate effects working on the export side
and not on the import side. While exchange rate induced price changes with imports work
immediately, changes through exchange rate effects on export revenues lead to different price
setting behaviour in the long term.
19This result is in contrast to the finding of Choi et al. (2017) who reports that the effect of the oil price on
inflation is no longer found after 2 years.
20Note that the Brent oil price index is higher than the Russian, Mexican and OPEC oil price.
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To which extent can demand explain inflation? Table 1 shows that demand factors (do-
mestic and global) account for the smallest shares of explained forecast error variance of
inflation in the short run. In the long run, they are the third important factor in the ad-
vanced countries - with few exceptions, behind foreign prices and monetary policy factors. In
CESEE and EMEs they are the least important factor in explaining forecast error variance
of inflation.
From Table 2 we see that domestic demand accounts for only 1-7 per cent of forecast error
variance of inflation in the short and long run. Particularly in CESEE economies (including
Slovakia) and in EMEs, domestic demand accounts for higher shares of forecast error variances
of inflation.21 In the advanced countries domestic demand only sparsely explains inflation
(e.g., in the USA and Germany).
In section 3 we mentioned that foreign output development can also generate demand-
pull inflation. Evidence for such external demand-driven inflation is found in all countries
(see Table 3). In the advanced countries, in contrast to the modest contribution of domestic
demand for inflation, foreign demand plays a much more important role for inflation, in the
short run and even more in the long run, accounting for 13 to 24 per cent of forecast error
variance of inflation, with few exceptions below that value (e.g. Greece). Particularly in the
small advanced economies like Switzerland, Austria, Finland, Netherlands and Ireland, the
inflation impact of foreign demand is high, accounting for 18 to 24 per cent of forecast error
variance of inflation. Also, in CESEE the impact of foreign demand on inflation is higher than
the domestic, explaining in the long run 14 per cent of forecast error variance of inflation in
Hungary and Poland. Also in EMEs, foreign demand explains more of forecast error variance
of inflation than domestic demand (except for Russia) – in the long run 11 per cent in China
and 16 per cent in Turkey.
In summary, foreign demand is a stronger driver of inflation than domestic demand in
almost all countries examined.
Monetary policy factors (domestic and global) are generally, with few exceptions, the
third most important factor for inflation in the short run, behind lagged domestic inflation
and foreign prices, and the second most important factor in the long run (see table 1).
Domestic interest rate policy plays an almost equally low role for inflation as demand in
the short run. However, in the long run, in some EMEs monetary rates, are the main driver of
inflation, accounting for 27 per cent in Turkey, 24 per cent in Mexico and 29 per cent in China
of forecast error variance of inflation.22 Also in the Czech Republic and Hungary, shocks to
interest rates are a major determinant with shares of explained forecast error variance of 13
per cent in the long term. In the euro area, shocks to interest rates account for about 6-7
per cent of forecast error variance of inflation in the long term in several small economies
(Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Greece) and 9-13 per cent in several large economies (Germany,
France, Italy). In the other advanced economies, short-term interest rates account for 2 per
cent (UK) to 7 per cent (Japan) of forecast error variance in the long run. In general, these
21For India, an equally high impact of demand-driven inflation as in our results is also found by Mohanty
and John (2015), but only for the non-crisis period.
22Also Huang et al. (2010) indicates liquidity as a major inflationary force in China
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results are an indication that money supply matters for inflation and inflation targeting is
thus an important framework for these countries, especially the EMEs.
Other countries interest rates are also found to play a role for domestic inflation (see
Table 3). In this case, domestic monetary development is regarded against foreign interest
rate development, leading to inflation development relative to the reference country. Our
results indicate that in all advanced countries and also in CESEE foreign inflation is much
more influenced by foreign CBs interest policy than by domestic monetary policy, in the
short and in the long run. In these countries, foreign interest rates often account for a much
larger share of forecast error variance, than domestic interest rates. In particular, shocks to
interest rates of major economies like the USA and the euro area matter for other countries.
In EMEs, the picture is more mixed. In some countries, shocks to domestic interest rates
account for larger shares compared to global interest rates (Mexico, China, Turkey), in others
monetary policy abroad matters more (Brazil, India, Russia).
To conclude, in the long run (see Table 1), foreign prices are generally the most impor-
tant explanatory of forecast error variance of inflation in advanced countries. Only in a few
advanced countries internal price persistence dominates inflation development (Greece, Slo-
vakia). Monetary policy factors (domestic and global) generally account for the second largest
share of forecast error variance of inflation in advanced countries in the long run. In contrast,
in most EMEs, domestic past inflation accounts for most of forecast error variance in infla-
tion. Only in China and Turkey, monetary policy factors (domestic or global) explain most
of forecast error variance of inflation. In CESEE, all considered factors tend to contribute
equally to explaining shares of forecast error variance of inflation, with some dominance of
monetary factors. As indicated in Table 1, demand factors (domestic and global) show the
smallest shares in the short run. In the long run, they are the third important factor in the
advanced countries - with few exceptions, behind foreign prices and monetary policy factors.
In CESEE and EMEs, they are the least important factor for inflation.
Determinants of short-term money market rates based on a forecast error
variance decomposition
Short-term interest rates, our indicator for monetary policy23 are considered in our model
to be explained among other factors by:
- Lagged domestic interest rates and term spread it−1, spt−1 as indicator for recent move-
ments in domestic monetary policy
- Other domestic factors: Inflation pi, output development (indicated by output growth
∆y, development of equity prices eq) and exchange rate er.
- Global factors: foreign money market rates i∗ and term spread sp∗ as proxy for foreign
monetary policy; foreign output development, indicated by foreign GDP growth ∆y∗
23We are aware that short-term interest rates may deviate from the interest rates set by CBs if the interest
pass-through is distorted.
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and equity development eq∗; foreign exchange rates er∗, foreign price development pi∗
and oil prices poil.
According to Figure 4, the FEVD indicates that in the short run, shocks to domestic
factors account by far for the largest share of forecast error variance of interest rates (over 90
per cent in most countries, except for Canada, Japan and the UK). In most EMEs, domestic
factors clearly dominate also in the long run. In contrast, in advanced countries, global
factors determine over 50 per cent of forecast error variance of interest rates in the long term.
Tables 5 and 6 allow to look at the determinants of forecast error variance in more detail.
In the short run, (see Table 5) the FEVD show that past interest rates explain from
about 70 to far beyond 90 per cent of forecast error variance of interest rates, irrespective
whether it is the euro area, the USA, transition countries or EMEs. Only in a few advanced
countries like Canada and the UK this effect is somewhat lower. In the long term (see Table
5), forecast error variance of interest rates is explained to a significantly lower extent by an
autoregressive part. Past interest rate policy explains about 20 per cent in most advanced
countries, except in the euro area where its contribution is 51 per cent. A higher persistence
of interest rates is found in CESEE and EMEs, ranging from 31 per cent in Hungary to 100
per cent in China.
Among the other domestic factors accounting for forecast error variance of interest rates,
shocks to domestic prices, output and the exchange rate appear in almost all countries in the
sample (see Table 5).
In the advanced countries, about 2 per cent of interest rate movements can be explained
by output development in the short term and in the long term. Particularly in the euro area
and Switzerland, shocks to output explain a larger share of forecast error variance (12 and 7
per cent, respectively). But also in the USA and the UK (both 5 per cent) shocks to output
play a more important role. In the euro area, a closer look at the explanatory factors (not
indicated in Table 5) shows that shocks to output in Germany, France and Italy explicitly
explain, in addition to the lagged interest rate, forecast error variance of short term interest
rates.
The co-movement of short-term interest rates and output development in advanced coun-
tries may be considered as evidence that CBs are concerned about output developments
in their monetary policy. Such interpretation would coincide with the finding of Svensson
(1999) and Markov (2015) that output is prominently guiding monetary policy in industrial-
ized countries.
For CESEE economies and EMEs we find a more heterogeneous relation between output
development and interest rates. In some countries, shocks to output explain forecast error
variance of interest rates to a high extent, for example in the Czech Republic (6 per cent),
Mexico (8 per cent) and Russia (6 per cent), in other countries to a lesser degree (e.g., in
Brazil, China and Turkey).
Domestic inflation, in the short term, hardly plays a role for short term interest rates in
advanced countries (see Table 5). In the long term, domestic inflation explains a higher share
of forecast error variance in advanced countries such as in the USA and in the euro area.
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However, here a large share of forecast variance can be explained by shocks to foreign prices
(including oil prices) in the long term (8 - 16 per cent, see Table 6). For example, in total,
price developments (domestic and foreign) determine 12 per cent of forecast error variance of
interest rates in the USA and 10 per cent in the euro area in the long term. In contrast, in
CESEE and EMEs, domestic price developments are partly significantly more relevant. This
applies for Hungary, Poland (explaining both 7 per cent of interest rate), Brazil (3 per cent),
Mexico (11 per cent ) and Turkey (6 per cent). Foreign price developments and the oil price
are only equally important as in advanced countries in Hungary, Poland (10 and 12 per cent)
and Brazil (8 per cent). In other EMEs foreign prices explain a lesser share of forecast error
variance. In total, in the long term, price developments thus account for a large share of
forecast error variance in Hungary by 17 per cent and of Poland by 19 per cent, 11 per cent
in Brazil and 13 per cent in Mexico. Moreover, since prices are also influenced by foreign
exchange rate developments, monetary authorities are likely to consider also exchange rate
development of main trading partners when deciding about a rate change. The FEVD shows
that forecast error variance of interest rates is explained to a similar extent by shocks to
exchange rates and foreign prices. In advanced countries and in CESEE, shocks to foreign
exchange rates account for 5-13 per cent of forecast error variance (see Table 6) in the long
term. For the USA and the euro area, this share is about 7 per cent.
Thus we have to conclude from our estimations that in our sample, price developments
shape interest rate movements (except for China). Interest rates are strongly driven by
movements in prices – taking the impact of domestic and foreign prices together – in Canada,
Sweden, the UK, Hungary and Poland, followed by Norway, Mexico, the USA, Brazil, the
euro area, Japan and Turkey. Also if taking all price and exchange rate movements (domestic
and of trading partners) together as indicator for price concerns of monetary authorities, it
appears that in the same countries, Canada, Sweden, UK, Hungary and Poland, CBs are
most concerned about inflation, followed by, Norway, Mexico, Switzerland, USA, Japan,
Brazil, Turkey, the Czech Republic and the euro area. Taking this broader view of price
factors, we find no clear pattern whether monetary policy in advanced countries, CESEE or
EMEs is more concerned about inflation. This differentiates our findings of the IR where
interest rates increased stronger to inflationary shocks in CESEE and EMEs.
The development of the value of the domestic currency is practically always explaining a
large share of forecast error variance of interest rates, irrelevant whether we look at advanced
countries, CESEE or EMEs. Exceptions are the USA, Canada, the euro area, Switzerland and
Norway. As we measure the dollar exchange rate, it evidently cannot appear as a determinant
with the USA. In a number of countries, irrelevant of which country group, exchange rates
explain a more significant part of forecast error variance of interest rates: Australia (6 per
cent), UK (7 per cent), Czech Republic, Mexico, India (all 10 per cent) in the long term. This
finding extends the conclusion of Calvo and Reinhart (2000) who found for 39 advanced and
EMEs in the period 1970-1999 that monetary authorities manage exchange rates so that free
floating currencies are in fact non-existing, with an exception of the dollar, yen and German
mark.
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Among the global factors influencing domestic interest rates, foreign output growth and
foreign interest rates appear with all countries (see Table 6). Particularly in the advanced
countries and in CESEE, foreign growth and even more foreign interest rates account for
significant shares of forecast error variance of interest rates in the long term. In the long
term, 5 per cent (Czech Republic, euro area) to 34 per cent of national interest rates is driven
by foreign output growth. In general, the value lays above 10 per cent. In EMEs, this remains
below 10 per cent.
Given the strong interdependence of financial markets and the implications of the interest
rate parity condition, all CBs consider closely foreign interest movements. In our exercise
and in the long term, foreign interest rates are the most important international factor. In
Canada, Australia and Japan, national interest rates are determined by more than 40 per
cent by foreign interest rates. In the UK and in Brazil, the contribution reaches almost 30
per cent. In the USA it is 16 per cent and in the euro area 12 per cent. A closer look at
the results - not shown in the tables - shows that in particular CESEE and EMEs follow
US and euro area interest rates, which is in line with Hofmann and Bogdanova (2012) and
Feldkircher et al. (2016). We have to conclude that countries are obviously anticipating the
exchange rate effects that would arise from changing interest rate differentials.
In summary, our findings suggest that interest rates are shaped by a multiplicity of domes-
tic and global factors. Among the domestic factors, with practically all countries, domestic
inflation, output growth and exchange rates appear as most important variables. In advanced
countries, shocks to output account for a particularly large share of forecast error variance,
while in other countries shares of domestic inflation, output growth and exchange rate devel-
opment are more balanced. Strikingly, we find that global factors are influencing interest rates
by more than 50 per cent in many advanced countries. Particularly, foreign interest rates
and foreign growth appear as important factors. In EMEs foreign factors account for much
smaller shares of forecast error variance of interest rates. This, indirectly provides insights
what drives CB interest policy. This is valuable since generally no such policy guidelines are
published by monetary authorities.24
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the nexus between inflation and monetary policy considering
explicitly the impact of global forces.
Estimating a GVAR, we obtained the following results. First, we observed the reaction
of monetary policy and output to an inflation shock looking at the impulse responses. Since
interest rates generally increase due to an inflationary shock (except for the UK and Japan),
we conclude that monetary policy is concerned about inflation. A notable increase can be
seen in the USA, euro area and in certain CESEE and EMEs. The consequence of raising
24An exception is the Bank of England which publishes guidelines for its interest rate policy. Interestingly, in
the case of the UK, our results reflect the statement of the Bank of England of domestic and external indicators
that should guide its interest policy, among them output growth, the exchange rate and developments in the
USA, euro area and EMEs which we find also as most important factors in our estimations.
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interest rates in reply to an inflation shock is a decline in output, unless a strong demand
pull situation prevails. Our results suggest that an increase in euro area short-term rates
disproportionately dampens output in Germany, Italy, Finland and Greece while not reducing
Spain’s overheating. Also in CESEE the negative response of output to an increase in interest
rates is significant.
Consequently, we looked at the empirical determinants of inflation on the one hand, and
monetary policy on the other hand, as provided by a forecast error variance decomposition.
These analyses suggest that in advanced countries, notably in the euro area, inflation is
explained by about 50 per cent in the short run and even 80 per cent in the long run by
global factors. In CESEE and even more so in EMEs, global factors have a much smaller
impact on inflation.
Decomposing the inflation determinants in a functional way provides further insights.
First, we observe a persistence of inflation in the short run, particularly in EMEs and
second also in CESEE, but much lesser in advanced countries. That persistence drops signif-
icantly in the long run after 12 quarters.
Second, we find that foreign price developments influence inflation notably in advanced
countries, explaining 55 per cent of inflation in the long run. Furthermore, the oil price
development is an evident factor for inflation in all countries of our sample. In addition,
exchange rate development have an influence on inflation in all regarded countries explaining
10-20 per cent of inflation.
Third, we observe that next to those factors, monetary policy is an important determinant
of inflation, particularly in the long run. In several EMEs it is even the main factor driving
inflation. This provides evidence that IT is a helpful monetary policy framework to watch
inflation. For EMEs it is crucial to stabilize inflation.
Fourth, our results suggest that demand factors are the least important determinant of
inflation.
Our estimations also permit to identify the factors explaining variance in short-term
interest rates, and thus of monetary policy. While domestic factors clearly play a dominant
role in EMEs, in advanced countries, this is only true in the short run. In the long run and
in advanced countries, shares of global factors are particularly large.
Distinguishing different functional determinants of short-term interest rates, we observe
in our estimations:
First, price developments influence interest rate movements (except for China). However,
central banks watch domestic and foreign price developments when deciding on interest rates.
Particularly in the advanced countries, shares of foreign price developments in explaining
forecast error variance of interest rates are large, while in CESEE and EMEs domestic price
developments dominate. Price developments are most important in Scandinavian countries,
the UK, Mexico, Brazil, the USA, the euro area, Japan and Turkey.
Second, we find that high shares of forecast error variance of interest rates are explained
by output, particularly so in the euro area, Switzerland, the UK and the USA. Moreover,
exchange rates appear as an important determinant of monetary policy of most countries in
our study. Noteworthy exceptions are the USA, Canada, the euro area and Switzerland.
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Also, global output and interest rate developments play an important role for domestic
interest rates. Clearly, for advanced countries and CESEE these shares are higher as these
countries are more linked to the global economy.
We can conclude that the interaction between inflation and monetary policy is subject
to considerable global influences, particularly in the advanced countries. Price developments
in these countries are heavily influenced by foreign prices. From the perspective of a pol-
icymaker, this implies that central banks have to watch closely foreign interest and price
developments when setting their own rates.
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A Prior setup
This section provides further information on the priors for the GVAR model. For the indica-
tors that control the mixture distribution, we impose a Bernoulli prior with
δij ∼ Bernoulli(pij). (12)
We set pij = Prob(δij = 1) = 1/2 for all i, j. This implies that a priori, all variables are
equally likely to enter Equation 2. The scaling parameters are specified following a semi-
automatic approach where the OLS standard deviation of a given parameter, denoted by σˆij ,
is used to construct τij,0 = 3× σˆij and τij,1 = 0.1× σˆij
Similarly to the prior on the regression coefficients we impose a SSVS prior on the off-
diagonal elements of Ui,
uij,n|κij,n ∼ N (0, ϕ2ij,n0)κij,n +N (0, ϕ2ij,n1)(1− κij,n), (13)
where κ2i,jn is again a Bernoulli distributed random quantity that selects the mixture Gaussian
component and ϕ2ij,n0, ϕ2ij,n1 are prior scalings such that ϕ2ij,n0  ϕ2ij,n1. For the scalings on
the covariance parameters we follow George et al. (2008) and set ϕij,n0 = 7 and ϕij,n1 = 0.1.
Since prior information on inclusion/exclusion of a given covariance parameter is rather
scarce, we again adopt a Bernoulli prior with prior inclusion probability set to qij,n =
Prob(κij,n = 1) = 1/2,
κij,n ∼ Bernoulli(qij,n). (14)
We follow Kastner (2016) and impose a normally distributed prior on µij ∼ N (0, 102), a
Beta distributed prior on ρij+12 ∼ B(25, 5) and a Gamma prior on ς2ij ∼ G(1/2, 1/2).
As mentioned in Section 2, our model collapses to a homoscedastic GVAR model if ς2ij
equals zero. The Gamma prior on ς2ij is equivalent to imposing a normally distributed prior
on ±ςij ,
ς2ij ∼ G(1/2, 1/2)⇔ ±ςij ∼ N (0, 1). (15)
This prior centers ςij on zero, if necessary and thus softly shrinks the model toward a ho-
moscedastic specification, if necessary.
We sample from the N + 1 country-specific posterior distributions in parallel (where
N is the number of countries). The MCMC algorithm is standard in the literature for
VAR models. Specifically, we sample Ci on an equation-by-equation basis (for details, see
Carriero et al., 2015) from an multivariate normal distribution. The off-diagonal elements
of Ui can be simulated by noting that the system can be rewritten as a set of ki univariate
regression models with standard normally distributed errors (see Cogley and Sargent, 2005).
The log-volatilities and the parameters of the state equation are simulated by means of the
algorithm provided in Kastner (2016) and implemented in the R package stochvol (Kastner
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and Hosszejni, 2019). Finally, we sample the indicators δij and κij,n from their Bernoulli
distributed conditional posterior distributions.25
Finally, we specify the remaining hyperparameters for the prior. Specifically and following
George et al. (2008), we set τ2ij,0 = 3σˆ2ij and τ2ij,1 = 0.1σˆ2ij , where σˆ2ij are the OLS variances
associated with cij . For the covariance parameters, we simply specify ϕ2ij,n0 = 3 and ϕ2ij,n1 =
0.1 for all i, j, n. We execute the MCMC algorithm for each country simultaneously and use
60,000 iterations with the first 30,000 being discarded as burn-in.26
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Figure 1: Impulse responce of interest rate to inflation shock
25For further information on the specific posterior moments, see Feldkircher and Huber (2016).
26Due to storage limits we use a thinning interval to select 6,000 out of the 30,000 posterior draws. From
these, we sort out unstable posterior draws which are characterized by large eigenvalues of the companion form
of the global model which leads to approximately 27% of the 6,000 posterior draws upon which the impulse
response analysis in Section 4 is based.
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Figure 2: Impulse responce of output to inflation shock
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Blue - domestic determinants of variation, Red - global determinants of variation
Figure 3: Forecast error variance decomposition of inflation, 1 period forecast horizon (left)
and 12 periods forecast horizon (right)
Blue - domestic determinants of variation, Red - global determinants of variation
Figure 4: Forecast error variance decomposition of interest rates, 1 period forecast horizon
(left) and 12 periods forecast horizon (right)
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Table 1: Forecast error variance decomposition of inflation: Determinants of Inflation in Total
t=1 t=12
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Lagged
domestic
Inflation
Foreign
prices &
currency
varia-
tions
Demand
(domes-
tic &
foreign)
Interest
Rate
(domes-
tic &
foreign)
Lagged
domestic
Inflation
Foreign
prices &
currency
variation
Demand
(domes-
tic &
foreign)
Interest
Rate
(domes-
tic &
foreign)
pit−1 pi∗, er, er∗ ∆y,∆y∗, i, i∗, pit−1 pi∗, er, er∗, ∆y,∆y∗, i, i∗,
poil eq, eq∗ sp, sp∗ poil eq, eq∗ sp∗
Advanced
non EA
US 0,83 0,08 0,04 0,05 0,30 0,19 0,18 0,33
CA 0,39 0,48 0,04 0,09 0,10 0,39 0,18 0,33
JP 0,71 0,16 0,04 0,09 0,17 0,34 0,14 0,36
AU 0,50 0,27 0,07 0,17 0,06 0,27 0,17 0,50
CH 0,13 0,59 0,12 0,16 0,03 0,42 0,20 0,35
NO 0,85 0,06 0,06 0,03 0,54 0,17 0,13 0,16
SE 0,42 0,45 0,06 0,07 0,11 0,36 0,18 0,35
UK 0,37 0,45 0,06 0,12 0,08 0,39 0,17 0,36
EA core
AT 0,23 0,60 0,09 0,08 0,04 0,43 0,20 0,33
BE 0,29 0,61 0,04 0,06 0,10 0,44 0,15 0,31
DE 0,29 0,54 0,09 0,08 0,09 0,39 0,18 0,34
FI 0,60 0,22 0,08 0,10 0,15 0,32 0,26 0,27
FR 0,22 0,65 0,05 0,08 0,07 0,43 0,15 0,35
IT 0,47 0,40 0,05 0,08 0,12 0,38 0,15 0,35
NL 0,41 0,35 0,04 0,21 0,05 0,38 0,20 0,37
EA pe-
riphery
ES 0,23 0,61 0,07 0,09 0,06 0,45 0,16 0,33
GR 0,81 0,12 0,02 0,05 0,43 0,22 0,12 0,23
IE 0,58 0,28 0,10 0,04 0,08 0,40 0,24 0,28
PT 0,48 0,37 0,03 0,12 0,12 0,42 0,15 0,31
SI 0,48 0,42 0,05 0,05 0,16 0,38 0,16 0,30
SK 0,91 0,06 0,02 0,01 0,65 0,15 0,09 0,11
CESEE
CZ 0,61 0,20 0,06 0,13 0,20 0,31 0,14 0,35
HU 0,79 0,03 0,07 0,11 0,33 0,18 0,16 0,33
PL 0,68 0,11 0,04 0,17 0,12 0,36 0,19 0,33
EME
BR 0,88 0,05 0,01 0,06 0,35 0,26 0,09 0,30
MX 0,81 0,04 0,03 0,12 0,46 0,13 0,08 0,33
CN 0,78 0,09 0,07 0,06 0,23 0,24 0,11 0,42
IN 0,86 0,04 0,07 0,03 0,46 0,18 0,12 0,24
RU 0,95 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,70 0,08 0,10 0,12
TR 0,83 0,05 0,02 0,10 0,21 0,20 0,17 0,42
Table 2: Domestic determinants of inflation
t=1 t=12
1 2 3 1 2 3
Domestic
inflation
lagged
Domestic
demand
∆y, eq
Domestic
monetary
policy
Domestic
Inflation
Domestic
demand
∆y, eq
Domestic
monetary
policy
pit−1 i, sp pit−1 i, sp
Advanced non
EA
US 0,83 0,02 0,02 0,30 0,05 0,04
CA 0,39 0,01 0,02 0,10 0,01 0,03
JP 0,70 0,01 0,02 0,17 0,01 0,07
AU 0,50 0,01 0,04 0,06 0,02 0,06
CH 0,13 0,01 0,01 0,03 0,01 0,04
NO 0,85 0,05 0,02 0,54 0,04 0,03
SE 0,42 0,03 0,01 0,11 0,03 0,04
UK 0,37 0,01 0,02 0,08 0,02 0,02
EA core
AT 0,23 0,02 0,01 0,04 0,01 0,07
BE 0,29 0,00 0,01 0,10 0,01 0,07
DE 0,29 0,01 0,01 0,09 0,04 0,09
FI 0,60 0,01 0,01 0,15 0,02 0,08
FR 0,22 0,00 0,01 0,07 0,00 0,10
IT 0,48 0,01 0,02 0,12 0,01 0,13
NL 0,41 0,01 0,02 0,05 0,01 0,11
EA periphery
ES 0,23 0,00 0,02 0,06 0,01 0,09
GR 0,81 0,00 0,01 0,44 0,01 0,06
IE 0,58 0,01 0,01 0,08 0,01 0,07
PT 0,48 0,00 0,01 0,12 0,00 0,06
SI 0,48 0,01 0,01 0,16 0,01 0,10
SK 0,92 0,02 0,00 0,66 0,03 0,03
CESEE
CZ 0,61 0,04 0,08 0,20 0,03 0,13
HU 0,78 0,01 0,09 0,33 0,02 0,13
PL 0,68 0,02 0,02 0,12 0,05 0,03
EME
BR 0,88 0,00 0,00 0,36 0,00 0,01
MX 0,81 0,03 0,11 0,46 0,04 0,24
CN 0,78 0,00 0,02 0,23 0,01 0,29
IN 0,86 0,07 0,00 0,46 0,05 0,01
RU 0,95 0,02 0,01 0,70 0,07 0,04
TR 0,82 0,00 0,08 0,21 0,00 0,27
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Table 5: Domestic determinants of interest rates
t=1 t=12
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Lagged
domestic
mone-
tary
policy
it−1, spt−1
Domestic
Prices pi
Domestic
Ex-
change
Rate er
Domestic
Output
Growth
∆y, eq
LAgged
Domes-
tic
Mone-
tary
Policy
it−1, spt−1
Domestic
Prices pi
Domestic
Ex-
change
rate er
Domestic
Output
Growth
∆y, eq
Advanced
non EA
US 0,71 0,01 0,00 0,02 0,23 0,04 0,00 0,05
CA 0,43 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,06 0,00 0,00 0,01
JP 0,70 0,01 0,02 0,02 0,23 0,01 0,02 0,02
AU 0,71 0,00 0,18 0,03 0,22 0,01 0,06 0,02
CH 0,82 0,00 0,02 0,12 0,46 0,00 0,01 0,07
NO 0,83 0,00 0,02 0,02 0,16 0,01 0,01 0,02
SE 0,73 0,01 0,08 0,02 0,17 0,01 0,02 0,02
UK 0,66 0,00 0,04 0,01 0,19 0,01 0,07 0,05
ECB 0,87 0,00 0,00 0,09 0,51 0,02 0,01 0,12
CESEE
CZ 0,79 0,00 0,11 0,07 0,60 0,01 0,10 0,06
HU 0,78 0,03 0,01 0,06 0,31 0,07 0,01 0,03
PL 0,84 0,06 0,02 0,03 0,39 0,07 0,03 0,03
EME
BR 0,93 0,02 0,01 0,00 0,45 0,03 0,03 0,00
MX 0,78 0,01 0,12 0,09 0,62 0,11 0,10 0,08
CN 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
IN 0,85 0,00 0,12 0,01 0,62 0,00 0,10 0,02
RU 0,91 0,00 0,01 0,06 0,75 0,01 0,04 0,06
TR 0,94 0,02 0,02 0,00 0,65 0,06 0,03 0,00
Table 6: Global determinants of interest rates
t=1 t=12
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
Foreign
Growth
∆y∗, eq∗
Foreign
Mone-
tary
Policy
i∗, sp∗
Foreign
ex-
change
rate er∗
Foreign
Prices
pi∗, poil
Foreign
Growth
∆y∗, eq∗
Foreign
Mone-
tary
Policy
i∗, sp∗
Foreign
ex-
change
rate er∗
Foreign
Prices
pi∗, poil
Advanced
non EA
US 0,13 0,04 0,02 0,07 0,16 0,36 0,07 0,08
CA 0,05 0,43 0,02 0,03 0,16 0,47 0,12 0,16
JP 0,03 0,20 0,01 0,01 0,13 0,42 0,07 0,09
AU 0,02 0,03 0,01 0,01 0,12 0,44 0,06 0,08
CH 0,03 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,16 0,17 0,06 0,06
NO 0,03 0,02 0,01 0,06 0,34 0,25 0,11 0,12
SE 0,04 0,05 0,03 0,04 0,24 0,29 0,10 0,14
UK 0,14 0,11 0,02 0,02 0,16 0,29 0,07 0,15
ECB 0,02 0,01 0,00 0,01 0,05 0,12 0,07 0,08
CESEE
CZ 0,00 0,02 0,00 0,00 0,05 0,10 0,05 0,03
HU 0,04 0,03 0,02 0,03 0,13 0,22 0,13 0,10
PL 0,01 0,02 0,00 0,01 0,10 0,18 0,07 0,12
EME
BR 0,00 0,04 0,00 0,01 0,07 0,28 0,05 0,08
MX 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,04 0,01 0,02
CN 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
IN 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,06 0,12 0,03 0,04
RU 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,02 0,09 0,01 0,02
TR 0,00 0,01 0,00 0,00 0,08 0,08 0,06 0,04
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